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Jurisdiction 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated ("UCA") § 78-2-2(3)0). 
Issues & Standards of Review 
1. Estoppel, Waivery & Laches. 
Did the trial court err in determining that United States Fuel ("USF"), IP A, and ANR 
Co.1 were not barred by waiver, estoppel, and/or laches from asserting a priority date that is 
senior to that of Huntington-Cleveland's water right? (R. 2783, Tr. 10:20-15:16.) 
2. Violation of UCA § 73-4-11. 
Did the trial court err in allowing USF to challenge and overcome the first priority of 
Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Company ("Huntington-Cleveland") to the waters of Cedar 
Creek in this action when 
a. the Proposed Determination issued under UCA § 73-4-11 in the concurrent but 
separate General Adjudication of the San Rafael drainage2 had recognized Huntington-
Cleveland as holding the first priority (Ex's. 48-A & 139), and 
i. USF admittedly had not obj ected to the Proposed Determination within 
the 90-day time period set by both statute and stipulation (Ex's. 140 & 48-B), and 
1
 As IPA's and ANR's water rights all came from USF, these parties, unless otherwise 
indicated, will be referred to collectively herein as "USF." 
2
 In the Matter of the General Determination of the Rights to the Use of All the Water, 
both Surface and underground, within the Drainage Area of the San Rafael River in Sanpete, 
Emery, Garfield, and Wayne Counties in Utah, Civil No. 1435, Seventh District Court in and 
for Emery County (the "General Adjudication"). 
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ii. USF's late objection made no mention of challenging Huntington-
Cleveland's senior priority until it was supplemented five years later (Ex. 48-C), in light of 
b. the trial court' s having refused to allow the dispute over the rights to the waters 
of Cedar Creek to be determined either via the General Adjudication or a "mini-
adjudication." (R. 2736 flf 5-6; R. 1889; R. 2783, Tr. 10:20-15:16.) 
3. The Blackhawk Mine Water. 
Did the trial court err in ruling that Huntington-Cleveland was barred by estoppel 
from submitting any evidence that water from the Mohrland Portal of the Blackhawk Mine 
was tributary to Cedar Creek? (R. 1494-1500.) 
4. Forfeiture. 
a. Was the trial court's determination that the beneficial use of 542.64 acre-feet 
of water for the irrigation of 135.66 acres at the Ranch supported by substantial evidence? 
(R. 1864-68, 1876-77.) 
b. Did the trial court err in allowing, over Huntington-Cleveland5 s obj ection, Don 
Barnett to testify as an expert witness concerning the amount of acreage irrigated at the 
Ranch? (R. 1012-30.) 
c. Did the trial court err in ruling that the winter stockwater right for the Cedar 
Creek Ranch (the "Ranch"), i.e., Water Right no. 93-267, was not forfeited by nonuse when 
the uncontro verted evidence was that there was no beneficial use of such right during the 
winter months from 1981 to 1989? (R. 1867-68, 1876-77.) 
d. Did the trial court err in ruling that Water Right no. 93-3524 was not forfeited 
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despite the fact that two water reports submitted into evidence by USF (Ex. 158 and 159) 
established that USF had not used this water right as authorized in Hiawatha at any time 
between 1964 and 1972? (R. 1876-77.) 
Standards of Review 
Issues 1 and 3. "A trial court is accorded considerable latitude and discretion in 
applying and formulating an equitable remedy. We review the trial court's determination of 
a remedy in this case under a standard that acknowledges considerable discretion in the trial 
court, and we will not upset the court's ruling unless it constituted an abuse of discretion." 
Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034,1041 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (citations omitted). 
Issne 2. Appellate courts review legal questions under the correctness standard. See 
Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1233 (Utah 1998), cert denied, 119 S.Ct. 1803 (1999). 
Issue 4(a). A trial court's findings of fact are viewed under a clearly erroneous 
standard of review. Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38, f 15, 979 P.2d 338. 
Issue 4(b). A trial court is granted broad discretion in determining whether expert 
testimony is admissible, and appellate courts review such decisions for abuse of discretion. 
See Gerbich v. Numed, Inc. 977 P.2d 1205, 1208 (Utah 1999). 
Issue 4(c) & 4(d). Appellate courts review factual questions under the clearly 
erroneous standard and legal questions under the correctness standard. See Jeffs v. Stubbs, 
970 P.2d 1234, 1233 (Utah 1998), cert denied, 119 S.Ct. 1803 (1999). Although legal 
questions are reviewed for correctness, appellate courts "may still grant a trial court 
discretion in its application of the law to a given fact situation." Jeffs, 970 P.2d at 1244. 
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Determinative Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-3 (1989) Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-11 (1989) 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-4 (1989) Utah Code Ann. § 73-5-13 (1989) 
Statement of the Case 
Nature of the Case 
This is a water rights case, focusing on the trial court's rulings on certain pretrial 
motions regarding priority dates and forfeiture; its oral rulings at trial denying the 
Huntington-Cleveland's motion in limine regarding US Fuel's ("USF's") late filing of 
objections to the Proposed Determination, but granting US Fuel's motion in limine to 
exclude evidence of water issuing from the Blackhawk Mine, through its final Order, 
Judgment, and Decree issued on September 10, 2001, and its application of the doctrine of 
partial forfeiture of water rights. 
The Course of Proceedings & Disposition Below 
USF initiated this action by filing a complaint on June 10, 1992. The complaint, as 
subsequently amended, sought to quiet title to certain water rights, to adversely possess 
and/or to effect the forfeiture of any water rights of Huntington-Cleveland in Cedar Creek, 
and to have the court prevent Huntington-Cleveland from interfering with USF's use of the 
water. IPA intervened to protect its stockwatering spring rights obtained from USF in the top 
of the drainage. Huntington-Cleveland counterclaimed seeking to have its water right 
adjudicated as the senior right, to have USF's rights declared abandoned and/or forfeited, and 
to have USF enjoined from trespassing against and converting water belonging to 
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Huntington-Cleveland. 
In 1993, Huntington-Cleveland moved that this matter be dismissed or stayed pending 
the outcome of the General Adjudication of the San Rafael drainage. That motion was 
denied. Later that year, Huntington-Cleveland petitioned the trial court seeking to have the 
matter heard as a "mini-adjudication" of the Cedar Creek drainage under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 73-4-24. The trial court, in its November 10, 1993 ruling, denied that petition 
On February 7, 1997, Huntington-Cleveland made a pre-trial motion seeking to bar 
any objections to the validity of its diligence claim for 10 cfs of water in Cedar Creek, based 
on the recent discovery that USF's objection to the Proposed Determination in the General 
Adjudication had been filed after the end of the statutory and contractual 90-day objection 
period. The trial court, in an oral ruling as part of a telephonic hearing on the Saturday before 
trial, denied that motion. Huntington-Cleveland renewed its motion during the trial, but the 
court again denied it. 
After an 8-day trial that ran on various days from February 10, 1997 through March 
21,1997, the court ordered written closing arguments, along with proposed findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. The written closing arguments and the proposed findings and 
conclusions were submitted in May through August of 1997. The court requested additional 
oral argument on several specific issues and a hearing was held on November 4, 1997. The 
trial court issued a Memorandum Decision on November 5, 1998 addressing most of the 
issues at trial. Huntington-Cleveland made a request for additional rulings in June of 1999, 
which were issued by the court on August 23,2000. Revised findings and conclusions were 
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then filed and objected to, followed by another hearing on December 13,2000. 
The court issued is final findings of fact and conclusions of law and the Judgment on 
September 10,2001, finally concluding the trial phase of this matter. The court ruled that the 
Ranch rights were senior to Huntington-Cleveland's 10 cfs right; that only a small portion 
of those rights and of the water conveyed over to Hiawatha had been forfeited for non-use; 
and that the stockwatering rights had not been forfeited during the winter season. 
Huntington-Cleveland filed its Notice of Appeal on October 2, 2001. 
Statement of Relevant Facts 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: HUNTINGTON-CLEVELAND 
1. Huntington-Cleveland is a mutual water company incorporated under the laws 
of the State of Utah. (R. 36, *[  1; 43, <|[ 1) It is the largest and oldest irrigation water provider 
in Emery County and services over 32,000 acres of land. (Ex. 55; R. 2788, T. 881-890) It 
was formed in 1932 by the merger of several separate irrigation companies to replace 
contention and confrontation with cooperation. (R. 2788, T. 882-884) 
2. One of those prior irrigation companies was the Cleveland Canal & Agriculture 
Company whose founders, beginning in 1885, constructed the approximately ten mile main-
stem of the Cleveland Canal from Huntington Creek at the mouth of Huntington Canyon to 
the town of Cleveland and surrounding farms. The canal was completed on May 1,1888 and 
began delivering water to the area on May 1, 1888. (R. 2788, T. 882, 886, 894) 
3. One of the other predecessors constructed the North Ditch that diverts water 
from Huntington Creek downstream from the diversion for the Cleveland Canal. The North 
Opening Brief 
AQIH A£Li"> (\nt\A /ur..£riQ H I T Page 6 of 50 
Ditch runs parallel to the Cleveland Canal, at a lower elevation, and also serves many farms 
in the Cleveland area. Construction of the smaller North Ditch began in 1877. (R. 2788, T. 
882; R. 2791, T. 1657) 
4. Both the Cleveland Canal and the North Ditch, as they proceed east towards 
the Cleveland area, cross a tributary of Huntington Creek known as Cedar Creek, which runs 
from the north to the south. Both canals intercepted all of the waters of Cedar Creek at their 
respective crossings. (R. 2788, T. 884-890; R. 2791, T. 1727) However, as Cedar Creek 
tended to have large spring run-off flows that would wash out the canals, Huntington-
Cleveland eventually constructed a cement flume across the Cleveland Canal to carry the 
flood waters safely over the canal. The flume, or "flood bridge" as it is commonly called, has 
an opening in the center that will allow up to 10 cfs of water from Cedar Creek to drop into 
the canal, an amount that can be safely added to the canal without washing it out. (R. 2788, 
T. 890-894) 
5. The North Ditch, on the other hand, was subsequently piped over the Cedar 
Creek wash and no further attempt was made to divert into the North Ditch any Cedar Creek 
flood waters that were excess of the 10 cfs that dropped into the Cleveland Canal. (R. 2788, 
T. 886-887; R. 2791, T. 1660-1661) 
6. In 1970 as part of an ongoing general stream adjudication, Huntington-
Cleveland filed its "Diligence Claim"3 on this 10 cfs of water from Cedar Creek claiming the 
3
 A diligence claim is a filing on a water right that pre-dates the application system 
adopted in 1903. Prior to 1903, water rights were obtained simply by the diversion of water 
and the beneficial use thereof. A diligence claim places such a right on the records of the 
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1885 priority date associated with the first water deliveries in the Cleveland Canal to the 
town of Cleveland. (Ex. 55) 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: USF, ANR CO., AND IP A 
7. The present controversy arises out of the fact that a ranch was established at 
approximately the same time as the construction of the canals about three miles up the Cedar 
Creek ("Ranch") from the Cleveland Canal. The Ranch encompassed 240 total acres. (R. 
1570-1571, \ 4, 5) Evidence at trial identified uses ranging from small gardens and 
cultivated crop lands to irrigated (but not cultivated) pastures and stockwatering, with the 
claimed irrigated acreage varying between 20 and 229.3 acres over the years. (See record 
citations in § III.A.2, below.) The irrigation water was diverted out of Cedar Creek into a 
small ditch that conveyed the water about one and a half miles to the Ranch. (R. 2787, Tr. 
594-595) The pastures and fields were flood-irrigated, with all of the return flows draining 
back into Cedar Creek a couple of miles upstream from the Cleveland Canal and eventually 
wound up in the Cleveland Canal. (R. 2785, Tr. 176; R. 2787, Tr. 627-628; R. 2788, Tr. 963-
964; R. 2789, Tr. 1116-1118; R. 2790, Tr. 1250-1257.) 
8, Plaintiff/Appellee USF, a coal mining company, operated two mines north of 
the Ranch. The Mohrland Mine had its portal at the mouth of Cedar Creek Canyon and the 
Blackhawk Mine, which was located in the next drainage, the Miller Creek drainage,4 to the 
State Engineer. The only time that such claims must be filed is when the water rights are the 
subject of a judicial adjudication. 
4
 Miller Creek is in a separate drainage basin. It flows into the Price River and then 
to the Green River, whereas Cedar Creek flows into Huntington Creek, and then into the San 
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north. The two mines are interconnected and intercept water, which flows by gravity out of 
the Mohrland Portal, the lower of the two portals. (R. 1573, f 11) In the 1930s, the mining 
company diverted water from Cedar Creek into the Mohrland Mine for use in the mine. This 
water was diverted high up the canyon into a nearby vertical "borehole" that had been drilled 
down to one of the mine shafts. (Ex.31) 
9. In the early part of the 20th century, there was a small mining town known as 
"Mohrland" located in the area around the Mohrland Portal. Mohrland has been vacant and 
abandoned since approximately 1938. (R. 2791, ^  8) Similarly, there was another small 
mining town known as "Hiawatha" near the Blackhawk Mine Portal. (R. 2791, ^ 9) It was 
disincorporated by court order in 1992 and was thereafter virtually abandoned, all except for 
some mining operations offices of USF. (R. 2788, Tr. 842-843; Ex. 179) 
10. Water leaves the Mohrland portal in a 12 to 15 inch pipe. About 50 feet outside 
of the portal, the pipe enters a cement "splitter box" where the water can be directed into 
either or both of two pipes exiting the splitter box. One pipe discharges into the nearby Cedar 
Creek and the other pipe conveys the water approximately five miles around the mountain 
to Hiawatha, where the water is either used or discharged into Miller Creek and redirected 
downstream at the "Millerton Ranch." (R. 1573,112,13) 
11. USF eventually acquired the Ranch and its water rights. (R. 1571,16; 1572, 
If 10) In December of 1997, shortly after the trial, USF sold the Ranch without the water 
rights to a third party and sold the Ranch's water rights to ANR, another mining company 
Rafael River, which in turn flows into the Green River. 
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operating the nearby Co-op mines. (R. 2344-2350.) IP A had previously purchased several 
"on stream" or "on spring" stockwatering water rights USF owned in the higher mountain 
regions at the top of the Cedar Creek drainage basin above the Mohrland Portal. (R. 52, % 1.) 
THE HISTORY OF THE PRESENT DISPUTE 
12. In the 1950s, a general adjudication of the San Rafael River and all of the 
smaller drainages that feed into the San Rafael River ("General Adjudication") was begun. 
In 1970, Huntington-Cleveland timely filed a "Water User's Claim Statement" ("WUCS") 
in the General Adjudication on its 10 cfs water right in Cedar Creek. The State Engineer, in 
his Proposed Determination issued on December 1, 1982, recognized Huntington-
Cleveland's 10 cfs water right as the senior irrigation water right on Cedar Creek. (Ex. 48-A, 
139) 
13. USF's agent Robert Eccli was served a copy of the Proposed Determination 
one year later on December 2, 1983 and signed a receipt and consent form wherein USF 
specifically consented to the entry of a final decree as set forth in the Proposed 
Determination unless it filed an objection thereto with the court within 90 days of said 
receipt. (Ex. 140) This 90-day objection period is also established by statute in Utah Code 
Ann. §73-4-11. 
14. On March 6, 1984, the 95th day after receipt of the Proposed Determination, 
USF filed an objection with the court which listed several of its water rights that it claimed 
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had been omitted5. (Ex. 48-B) At the end of its objection, USF included a general statement 
that the Proposed Determination listed "rights of junior appropriators, such as the Bureau of 
Land Management, that are adverse to its senior rights." It never claimed that any of the 
rights listed as senior to its rights were objectionable. (Id.) Over five years later, on August 
14, 1989, USF objected for the first time to Huntington-Cleveland's use of Cedar Creek 
water as set forth in the Proposed Determination. (Ex. 48-C) 
15. USF did not assert its own diligence claim to water used at the Ranch until 
1979. That claim asserted only a "pre-1903" priority date and was therefore assigned a 1902 
priority date in the Proposed Determination. (Ex. 36-A, 48-A) In 1990, the State Engineer's 
Office prepared a summary from the Proposed Determination listing of all the water rights 
on Cedar Creek. This summary also listed USF's priority date as 1902. (Ex. 144) 
16. Separately, with respect to USF mine water, USF filed a change application on 
Water Right No. 93-970 (a6962) with the State Engineer in 1972 seeking to pipe water from 
the Mohrland Portal around the mountain to Hiawatha ("Change Application"). (Ex. 33-A) 
Huntington-Cleveland timely protested the Change Application, and the State Engineer 
eventually approved the change in 1983, but expressly conditioned upon the change being 
"subject to all prior rights ... specifically those of the protestants." (Ex. 33-D, 33-E) 
17. Thereafter, USF constructed the pipeline and began conveying unknown 
quantities of water around the mountain to Hiawatha and the Millerton Ranch. There has 
5
 The objection was purportedly hand-delivered to the State Engineer's Office on the 
91st day and was mailed to the court for filing in the General Adjudication. The court 
received and filed the objection on the 95th day. 
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been no way for Huntington-Cleveland or any others to verify how much water USF diverts 
out of the Cedar Creek drainage and into the Miller Creek drainage via this pipeline because 
USF keeps the splitter box covered with a steel plate that is locked shut and the pipeline in 
not metered. (R. 2787, Tr. 708-709; R1601,1148; R. 2746, f 40.) 
FACTS RELEVANT TO USF's EXPERT, DONBARNETT 
18. The trial court's original Scheduling Order of July 10,1996, required USF to 
file its expert report by September 3,1996. (R. 948, ffl[ 1 &2.) The First Revised Scheduling 
Order (R. 961) extended this time to November 15,1996. USF, however, did not identify an 
expert because it had "determined that an expert was not required to present its case in chief." 
(R. 1145,1|2.) 
19. On December 3,1996, Huntington-Cleveland timely filed its expert report, and 
identified several experts, whereupon USF "determined that it would be prudent to obtain 
expert testimony primarily to rebut the testimony of [Huntington-Cleveland's] experts" {Id., 
f 3). USF belatedly identified Don Barnett as an expert rebuttal witness and filed an expert 
report on December 16,1996, thirty-one days after its November 15th deadline, and 13 days 
after Huntington-Cleveland had identified its experts. (R. 987-89.) 
20. In January of 1997, Huntington-Cleveland moved in limine to exclude the 
testimony of Don Barnett, based on his untimely identification. (R. 1012-1030.) USF, in its 
opposing memorandum (R. 1144-1170), asserted that the November 15,1996, deadline "was 
not applicable to rebuttal witnesses" (R. 1147). 
21. On February 8, 1997, at a telephonic hearing, the trial court ruled that Mr. 
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Barnett could testify only as a fact witness in the case in chief, and also as an expert witness 
on rebuttal. (R. 2792, Tr. 1789: 2-15.) 
Summary of Arguments 
The trial court erred in allowing USF to leapfrog its priority to the use of Cedar Creek 
back in time. After decades of delay, the doctrines of laches, estoppel, and waiver should be 
applied to reverse the holding of the trial court that USF has the first priority to the use of the 
water of Cedar Creek. Similarly, USF should not be able to use this action to circumvent its 
failure in the ongoing General Adjudication to timely submit an objection to the Proposed 
Determination. The trial court also erred by applying estoppel and laches to bar Huntington-
Cleveland from submitting evidence as to the water flowing from the Mohrland portal and 
tributary to Cedar Creek. Finally, the trial court did not go nearly far enough in applying the 
doctrine of partial forfeiture, under UCA § 73-1-4, and USF's water rights should be further 
reduced to conform to the limit of actual beneficial use. 
Argument 
I. The Doctrines of Estoppel, Laches, and Waiver, and UCA § 73-4-11 Bar USF 
from Asserting Senior Priority to the Water of Cedar Creek. 
Perhaps the most important aspect of a water right is its priority: Huntington-
Cleveland enjoyed senior priority as to the use of Cedar Creek until the ruling of the trial 
court, now on appeal. This ruling allowed USF to "leapfrog" its priority back in time far 
earlier than the priority date originally claimed by and assigned to USF for 113 years. The 
equitable doctrines of estoppel, laches, and waiver—arising from USF's entire failure to 
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timely challenge Huntington-Cleveland's water use—must be applied to bar this transparent 
action to "improve" its priority dates to dates ahead of Huntington-Cleveland.6 
Key to this discussion is the chronology of the various water right related filings on 
the waters of Cedar Creek for irrigation purposes. This chronology is set forth in the 
following table. 
Chronology of Water Filings 
J Year 
1889 
1 1893 
1 1907 
1 1910 
1 1912 
Document 
John Trimble, the original predecessor to USF, and two 
"disinterested" witnesses each filed affidavits as part of the 
homestead application process stating that water from Cedar Creek 
had been first used on the Ranch in the spring of that year. 
Water Commissioner, also as part of the homestead application 
process, filed a Water Certificate stating that water from Cedar 
Creek had been used on the Ranch for the past four years, i.e., since 
1889. 
George Miller, successor to John Trimble's estate, filed an 
application for the entire flow of Cedar Creek for use at the Ranch, 
apparently to enlarge its water right over that covered by the 1893 
water certificate. (Water Right No. 93-904) 
John Monsen, successor to George Miller, filed proof on the 
application suggesting that the original ditch may have first carried 
water to the Ranch in 1882. That suggestion is contrary to the 
affidavits filed in 1889 and the water certificate filed in 1893. 
State Engineer assigned a 1907 priority date and granted the 
application on Water Right No. 93-904; USF's predecessor did not 
contest the priority date assigned. 
Record 
citation 
Ex. 5-D 
Ex. 5-C 1 
Ex. 27-A 1 
Ex. 27-B 1 
Ex. 27-E 1 
6
 As this Court is well aware, in Utah, "first in time is first in right." Salt Lake City v. 
Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 2000 UT 3, f34, 5 P.3d 1206 {citing UCA § 73-3-1). A senior 
priority right holder may use all of his or her water before a junior water-right holder may 
take any. UCA §73-3-21. 
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1 1970 
1 1979 
1 1982 
1 1983 
1 1984 
1 1989 
1 1992 
1 1992 
1 1993 
Huntington-Cleveland filed a Diligence Claim with the State j 
Engineer and a Water Users Claim Statement ("WUCS") in the 
General Adjudication, both asserting an 1885 priority date based on 
the construction period of the Cleveland Canal. (Water Right No. 
93-1134) 
USF filed a WUCS in the General Adjudication asserting a 
"pre-1903" priority date, but not an 1889 or 1882 priority date. 
(Water Right No. 93-267) 
State Engineer issued the Proposed Determination recognizing 
Huntington-Cleveland's watertight with an 1885 priority and USF's 
water right with a 1902 priority based on the WUCS and a 1907 
priority date based on the 1907 application. 
USF was served a copy of the Proposed Determination and 
consented to entry of judgment as per the Proposed Determination 
unless it filed a written objection with the court within 90 days. 
USF filed a written objection with the court 95 days after signing 
the consent form, but made no specific objection concerning 
Huntington-Cleveland's senior right. 
USF filed a second objection in which it objected to Huntington-
Cleveland's senior right for the first time. 
USF filed its complaint initiating this action. Exhibit A to the 
complaint (R. 22, incorporated as a list of USF's water rights by f 
4 at R. 2) lists 1902 as the priority date of Water Right No. 93-267 
and 1907 as the priority date for Water Right No. 93-904. 
USF filed its first Diligence Claim, thirteen years after its claim 
should have been filed in the General Adjudication and one month 
after it filed the complaint, and for the first time asserted an 1882 
priority date. (Water Right No. 93-3680) 
Huntington-Cleveland amended its prior Diligence Claim (Water 
Right No. 93-1134) and asserted an 1877 priority date based on new 
information about the North Ditch and its construction period. 
Ex. 
55 & 57 
Ex. 36-A 1 
Ex's. 48-A 1 
&139 
Ex. 140 1 
Ex. 48-B 1 
Ex. 48-C 1 
R. 1-23 1 
Ex. 36-C 1 
Ex. 56 1 
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A. USF's Century of Delay (1889-1992 & 1907-1992) in Asserting a Senior 
Priority. 
USF's claim to the water of Cedar Creek is rooted in John Trimble, who, in 1889, 
homesteaded the property now known as the Ranch. As part of the homesteading process, 
he was required to file an affidavit or "deposition" setting forth his water use on the property 
and to obtain similar affidavits from two disinterested persons. Each of those affidavits, made 
under oath in the summer of 1889, stated no crops had been grown yet because Mr. Trimble 
first got water to the land at the beginning of the present season. (Ex. 5-D, ^ 11 in the 
Trimble Affidavit and f 9 in the other affidavits.) These contemporaneous filings made 
under oath, and submitted into evidence by USF, are the best possible evidence of when 
water was first diverted from Cedar Creek to the Ranch for irrigation purposes by USF's 
predecessors. The quantity of water is unspecified, but the affidavits state that there is 
sufficient water for the irrigable acreage on the 160 acre homestead. (Ex. 5-D ^ 5 and ^ 4 
respectively.) 
The 1889 date of initial usage by USF's predecessor is corroborated by another trial 
exhibit submitted by USF, i.e., the 1893 "water certificate" recorded by the "water 
commissioner" on behalf of the estate of John Trimble in furthering the homestead 
application process. (Ex. 5-C) This certificate states that water diverted from Cedar Creek 
had been used on the homestead for the last four years past. Again the quantity is 
unspecified, but the initial date of usage is established as 1889. 
This 1889 water right has never been made of record, either with the court as part of 
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the General Adjudication via a WUCS or with the State Engineer's Office via a diligence 
claim. Therefore, even to the present day, it has never been assigned a water right number.7 
From 1889, until 1992 when USF filed a diligence claim asserting an 1882 priority 
date in connection with Water Right No. 93-3680 (Ex. 36-C), USF had never asserted a 
priority date earlier than 1889. During this 103-year period, USF and its predecessors alluded 
to the potential of an earlier priority date twice. The first reference was in 1910 by a party 
several links down the chain of title from the original homesteader and therefore, obviously 
with less first-hand knowledge as to the facts. The second reference was a full century after 
the original filings when USF filed an untimely objection in 1989 to the 1885 priority date 
assigned to Huntington-Cleveland's Cedar Creek water right (no. 93-1134) in the General 
Adjudication of the San Rafael drainage. 
The 1910 filing was a "proof of appropriation" filed by John Monsen (Ex. 27-B) 
concerning a 1907 "application to appropriate" filed by his immediate predecessor, George 
Miller (Ex. 27-A). This water right was designated as Water Right No. 93-904. The 1910 
"proof1 mentions that water first delivered through the ditch in 1882, not with respect to an 
assertion of priority, but in response to a question about the history of the diversion works 
and it provides no information as to the source of this date. 
The early documents filed on Water Right No. 93-904 are enlightening in several 
7
 Presumably, however, the water represented by the 1893 "water certificate" issued 
by the water commissioner is the same water as that represented by USF's WUCS filed in 
1979 asserting a "pre-1903" priority date, and assigned Water Right no. 93-267, as well as 
that represented by USF's diligence claim filed in 1992 asserting an 1882 priority date, and 
assigned Water Right no. 93-3680. 
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important respects. The first is that George Miller's act of applying for "unappropriated" 
water in 1907 is, by definition, evidence of the fact that he and his predecessors were neither 
claiming nor entitled to all of the water in Cedar Creek as of 1907. The 1910 "proof1 by John 
Monsen on the 1907 application also evidences this same fact by expressly stating that the 
ditch was being enlarged to convey all of the water from Cedar Creek to the Ranch. (Ex. 27-
B, General Remarks) Finally, neither John Monsen nor USF, even after mentioning the issue 
in 1910, ever acted upon this "knowledge" by filing a diligence claim or a WUCS asserting 
the 1882 priority in the General Adjudication in 1979 or at any time in the intervening 70 
years. Indeed, the first assertion of 1882 as the priority date was in 1992 when USF filed its 
tardy diligence claim, which became Water Right No. 93-3680. (Ex. 36-C.) 
Similarly, USF and its predecessors never challenged or objected to the 1907 priority 
date assigned to Water Right No. 93-904 in the Certificate issued thereon in 1912 by the 
State Engineer8. USF, apparently content with its 1889 and 1907 priorities, accepted and held 
fast to these priority dates for a full century until 1992 when it first asserted a claim to an 
earlier priority. This century of inaction by USF was overlooked by the trial court. The facts 
set forth above meet each of the requirements for estoppel, waiver, and laches, separately and 
collectively. 
8
 Then, as now, the priority for an applicant who appropriates water is the date the 
application is actually filed with the State Engineer. See Tanner v. Bacon, 136 P.2d 957 
(Utah 1943) and Whitmore v. Murray City, 154 P.2d 748 (Utah 1944). This has been the law 
since March 12,1903, when application became the sole means to appropriate water in Utah. 
See 1903 Utah Laws ch. 100, § 47. Prior to March of 1903, water was acquired by diligence, 
i.e., directing the water to beneficial use. See East Jordan Irrigation Co. v. Morgan, 860 
P.2d 310, 316 (Utah 1993), for a discussion of these separate methods of appropriation. 
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/. Estoppel. Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands, 802 P.2d 
720, 728 (Utah 1990) sets forth the three elements for a successful assertion of estoppel: 
(1) an admission, statement, or act inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted, 
(2) action by the other party on the faith of such admission, statement, or act, and 
(3) injury to such other party resulting from allowing the first party to contradict 
or repudiate such admission, statement, or act. 
{quoting Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 
1979) (citing West v. Dep 't ofSoc 7 & Health Serv 's, 586 P.2d 516,518 (Wash. App. 1978)). 
In the present case, of course, USF neither challenged Huntington-Cleveland's priority 
nor asserted a superior entitlement for over a century. As a result, Huntington-Cleveland, 
during the course of the long decades of USF's silence, has forborne to challenge USF's 
water rights. This forbearance in reliance upon USF's silence, however, has now redounded 
to Huntington-Cleveland's severe injury9. USF's years of inaction, and Huntington-
Cleveland ' s reliance thereon, together with the harm to Huntington-Cleveland resulting from 
USF's suddenly reversing more than a century of acquiescence, bar USF from seeking (to 
say nothing of achieving) the resetting of its priorities ahead of Huntington-Cleveland's. 
2. Laches. The equitable doctrine of laches "bars a recovery when there 
has been a delay by one party causing a disadvantage to the other party." Plateau Mining Co. 
v. Utah Div. Of State Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 731 (Utah 1990). Successfully 
9
 As Huntington-Cleveland's claim to the water of Cedar Creek is based on diligence 
(i.e., pre-1903 use), it was impossible for Huntington-Cleveland to present eyewitnesses to 
its pre-1903 use of Cedar Creek at a trial in 1996. The earliest eyewitness accounts of 
Huntington-Cleveland's (or indeed of anyone's) use of Cedar Creek were from the 1920s. 
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assertion of laches requires 
(1) lack of diligence on the part of the claimant, and 
(2) injury to the defendant as a result. 
Id. USF waited for nearly a century after commenting on the possibility of having an 1882 
priority date in the 1910 "proof1 on a different water right (Ex. 27-B) before it asserted its 
present challenge. This can hardy be construed as diligence. Now, Huntington-Cleveland 
faces the loss of senior priority established by more than a century of peaceable, 
unquestioned possession, as duly recognized in the Proposed Determination. (Ex. 139) 
USF should not be permitted to dawdle away more than a lifetime and then—when 
living memory is lost and evidence has become stale (to put it mildly)—assert priority dates 
to which it made no claim for almost the entirety of the 20th Century. The doctrine of laches 
thus bars USF's claims, and the trial court erred in permitting those claims to go forward. 
3. Waiver. It is well-settled law that "mere silence is not a waiver unless 
there is some duty or obligation to speak." Brinton v. IHCHospitals, Inc., 973 P.2d 956,965 
(Utah 1998). Huntington-Cleveland acknowledges that during the first half of the 20th 
Century, USF was not obligated to place its diligence claim of record. However, once the 
General Adjudication was initiated in 1953, USF became obliged to raise all of its water right 
claims as part of that General Adjudication. Therefore, the issue of waiver is discussed more 
fully in section I.D. below. 
Opening Brief 
4837-4612-0704 / HufiOKOI 7 PodA 1(\ nf 5 0 
B. USF's 22-Year Delay (1970-1992). 
On November 5,1970, twenty-two years prior to USF's first claims of senior priority, 
Huntington-Cleveland memorialized with the State Engineer's Office its longstanding 
diligence claim of up to 10 cfs from the waters of Cedar Creek. (Ex. 55.) Under UCA § 73-
5-13(1989), this memorialization gave Huntington-Cleveland's water right claim prima-facie 
validity. 
It is noteworthy that, although during trial USF attacked Huntington-Cleveland's 1970 
diligence claim to the water of Cedar Creek, which has a priority of 1885, the trial court did 
not reject Huntington-Cleveland's diligence right, but held that it was junior to the leapfrog 
priority date of 1882 which it gave to USF. This ruling was not appealed. 
/ . Estoppel As in 1912, when it acceded to its 1907 priority without so 
much as raising an eyebrow in protest, USF said nothing at all in response—to say nothing 
of complaint or objection—to Huntington-Cleveland's memorialization of its 1885 diligence 
claim in 1970. (Ex. 55). However, 22 years later in 1992, upon deciding that it wanted to 
trump Huntington-Cleveland's theretofore unchallenged seniority, USF suddenly became 
very vocal. As before, though, USF cannot be heard to challenge anything after waiting more 
than two full decades before saying anything about it.10 
In reliance on USF's quiescent acceptance of junior status, Huntington-Cleveland has 
taken no steps to protect itself from such a turnabout as USF's sudden attack on the senior 
10
 Again, while it may have been possible in 1970 to present eyewitness testimony as 
to Huntington-Cleveland's 1882-1903 use of water, by 1996, eyewitness testimony had 
become impossible. 
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priority of Huntington-Cleveland's century-old diligence claim. Huntington-Cleveland now 
faces subordination of a water right it had proven and maintained for 107 years before being 
bereft of it by USF's entirely unexpected about-face. 
USF must be estopped from challenging Huntington-Cleveland's diligence claim 22 
years after it was memorialized, having been completely silent theretofore. 
2. Laches. Huntington-Cleveland memorialized its diligence claim over 
30 years ago. Yet despite notice in 1970 via the claims filed with both the court and the State 
Engineer's Office (Ex. 55, 57) that Huntington-Cleveland claims and has been using Cedar 
Creek water, USF gave no sign of protest or resistance until 1989. Only after 19 years was 
Huntington-Cleveland—to its clear disadvantage—required to surmount the obvious and 
significant difficulties of proving beneficial use beginning more than a century before. 
USF, whose opportunity to protest Huntington-Cleveland's diligence claim arose 
before the Watergate Break-in (which has long since been relegated to school history books), 
cannot equitably be permitted to trump a 107-year-old diligence claim after dawdling 19 
years away. 
5. Waiver. In 1970, Huntington-Cleveland's 1970 memorialized its 
century-old diligence right (Water Right No. 93-1134) with both the court and the State 
Engineer's Office as part of the General Adjudication. USF also filed a WUCS with the court 
on its irrigation water for Ranch (Water Right No. 93-267). Yet, not even when it was 
required to place all of its water rights and claims of record in the General Adjudication did 
USF file a WUCS asserting a priority date earlier than 1889. Instead it merely asserted a 
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"pre-1903" priority, which the State Engineer has no choice but to interpret as a 1902 
priority. (Ex. 36-A; 48-A) Likewise in 1989, when USF first objected to Huntington-
Cleveland's senior right in its 5-year late objection, USF did not allege a new priority date. 
When USF finally got around to asserting its alleged 1882 priority water right (Water 
Right No. 93-3680) in 1992 (Ex. 36-C), the Proposed Determination had already been 
completed for more than a decade (Ex. 48-A) and the objection period had expired in early 
1984, some eight years earlier. 
The failure to timely file its water right claims, once obligated to do so as part of the 
General Adjudication, constitutes a waiver of all such un-asserted claims. If all claims are 
not asserted, the General Adjudication becomes meaningless. USF has offered no 
explanation for its failure to timely assert its claims, specifically, the diligence claim it 
asserted in 1992 wherein it asserted for the first time the 1882 priority date. 
C USF's Nine-Year Delay (1983-1992). 
In 1972, USF filed a change application on water from the Mohrland Portal (Water 
Right No. 93-970) seeking to pipe it around the mountain to Hiawatha, Le.9 Change 
Application No. a-6962. (Ex. 33-A.) Huntington-Cleveland protested that Change 
Application. In May of 1983, the State Engineer issued a memorandum decision approving 
the Change Application, "subject to all prior rights, specifically those of the protestants 
[Huntington-Cleveland and the Bureau of Land Management], and to the quantities of water 
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specified above." (Ex. 33-E.)11 Yet again, despite this clear declaration from the State 
Engineer that its rights were junior to those of Huntington-Cleveland, U. S. Fuel did nothing 
to challenge, protest, object, or even complain about its lower priority. Not, at least, until 
1992, nine years later.12 
1. Estoppel For nearly a decade, USF sat idly by saying and doing 
nothing in response to the state engineer's clear recognition that the rights of Huntington-
Cleveland superseded its own. During that time, the long-ago memories in which were 
locked the actual facts of the priorities involved slipped even further into the unreachable 
past as weary age and silent death quietly stilled the living recollection of the final years of 
the nineteenth century in Emery County. The memories upon which Huntington-Cleveland 
could have called to protect its rights faded and died while USF stood mute. 
Now, with Huntington-Cleveland wholly bereft of the eyes, minds, and tongues it 
might have relied upon, USF should not be permitted to lay claims which no one is left to 
rebut due to its dilatory waiting game. USF should be estopped from doing so. 
2. Laches. For these same reasons, the doctrine of laches should bar USF 
from proclaiming its rights superior to those of Huntington-Cleveland. USF was directly 
informed by the State Engineer that its claims were inferior to those of Huntington-
11
 Strangely enough, the trial court relied upon this very memorandum decision, not 
to bar USF, but instead to bar Huntington-Cleveland's claim the Blackhawk Mine water 
discussed in § II, below. 
12
 The trial court, surprisingly, ruled that Huntington-Cleveland should have appealed 
this decision, which recognized and protected Huntington-Cleveland's senior water rights. 
Opening Brief 
Cleveland. Nine years of idleness can hardly be construed as diligent assertion of one's 
claimed rights—especially when that idleness cost Huntington-Cleveland its best opportunity 
to present supporting evidence of its own claims. 
3. Waiver. If USF had previously had any doubts about Huntington-
Cleveland's superior priority, the State Engineer's 1983 Memorandum Decision granting 
USF's change application subject to the superior rights of Huntington-Cleveland should have 
laid them to rest. At the very least, it should have roused USF from its Rip-van-Winkelesque 
torpor sufficiently for it to file an appeal, a protest, or a complaint or something. USF, 
however, according to its wont, did nothing at all. Surely it has waived any right to assert 
such claims now. 
D. USF's Fatally Late Objection. 
1. The 91st and 95th Days. In 1941, the Seventh District Court ordered the 
State Engineer to make a proposed determination of all water rights in the Ferron Creek 
drainage area. In 1953, the court enlarged the proposed determination and adjudication to 
include the entire San Rafael River drainage area. In 1980, the court clarified that its 1953 
order was for a "General Adjudication" of the San Rafael River drainage area under Chapter 
4 of Title 73, Utah Code Annotated. (Ex. 48-A, p. ii.) 
Accordingly, in 1970, Huntington-Cleveland timely filed a WUCS on the first 10 cfs 
from Cedar Creek. (Water Right No. 93-1134; Ex. 57) Nine years later, USF filed a WUCS 
on Cedar Creek water asserting only a "pre-1903" priority date. (Water Right No. 93-267; 
Ex. 36-A) On December 1,1982, pursuant to UCA § 73-4-11, the State Engineer published 
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his Proposed Determination, recognizing Huntington-Cleveland's 10 cfs water right as the 
senior water right in Cedar Creek and USF's rights as being 1902 and 1907 rights for Water 
Right Nos. 93-237 and 93-904 respectively. (Ex. 48-A & 139) 
One year later, on December 2, 1983, a copy of the Proposed Determination was 
served upon USF, pursuant to UCA § 73-4-11, along with a standard Notice, Receipt and 
Waiver form (Ex. 140), clearly declaring both that 
any claimant dissatisfied with said Proposed Determination must file with the 
Clerk of the above-entitled court a written objection thereto duly verified upon 
oath within ninety (90) days from and after the date of service of this notice . 
(id.) and that, having acknowledged receipt, the claimant 
consents to the entry of a final decree in this cause unless a formal protest is 
made by the undersigned claimant to the above-entitled court [i.e., the Seventh 
District Court] within ninety (90) days from and after the date hereof. 
(id.). The Notice, Receipt and Waiver form was executed, on December 2,1983, by Robert 
Eccli for USF. 
USF, however, despite the admonition of the Waiver form, did not submit a formal 
protest within 90 days of its receipt of the Proposed Determination. Instead, on the 91st day, 
Friday, March 2,1984, USF purportedly delivered an objection to the State Engineer's Office 
and mailed a copy to the Seventh District Court. (Ex. 48-B) Thus, the objection was not 
filed with the court as required by the Notice, Receipt and Waiver form until March 6,1984 
on the 95th day. (Id.) Five full days after the 90-day deadline had come and gone.13 
13
 Rather than address this issue head on in the General Adjudication, where all 
interested parties could be heard, USF sidestepped its failure to have timely and properly 
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Oddly, given the vehemence of its present stance, USF's March 6, 1984, 
objection—although it listed various water rights USF claimed had been omitted, and 
protested the Proposed Determination's listing of several junior rights adverse to its senior 
rights—made no mention at all of Huntington-Cleveland senior Water Right No. 93-1134. 
USF has thus plainly waived, by operation of law (UCA § 73-4-11) as well as by stipulation 
(the Notice, Receipt and Waiver form), any claim it may have believed itself to have as to 
the senior priority Huntington-Cleveland's Water Right No. 93-1134 and as to any un-
asserted claims USF may have had at that time. Not only was USF's 1984 objection to the 
allocation set forth in the Proposed Determination untimely, but even its untimely protest 
failed to object to Huntington-Cleveland's senior priority. 
2. The Violation of UCA § 73-4-11. On or about August 14,1989, nearly 
five-and-a-half years after filing its late objection, USF for the first time protested 
Huntington-Cleveland's use of Cedar Creek water as set forth in the Proposed 
Determination. Such tardy objection is, of course, entirely improper and ineffective. 
Directly on point is Jensen v. Morgan, 844 P.2d 287 (Utah 1992), a case which arose 
from this same San Rafael General Adjudication, wherein the plaintiff, Jensen, had been 
mailed a copy of book 5 of the Proposed Determination on March 4,1986. Book 5 included 
the State Engineer's recommendation that one of Jensen's claims be disallowed for nonuse. 
However, although the first page of book 5 set forth the same written notice as that given to 
objected in the General Adjudication, and brought this separate action. Such end-run, forum-
shopping tactics must not be allowed. 
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USF that water users disagreeing with the Proposed Determination must file an objection 
thereto within 90 days of receipt, as required by UCA § 73-4-11, Jensen filed no such 
objection until, on July 10,1989, he filed a petition in the General Adjudication proceeding 
objecting to the recommended disallowance. The trial court granted a motion to dismiss 
Jensen's petition, and Jensen appealed, claiming, among other things, failure of proper 
notice. 
This Court, however, determined after careful review that Jensen had in fact received 
proper notice, but had failed to file a protest within the statutorily mandated 90 days. Noting 
that ff[a]bsent a protest, the district court must enter judgment in accordance with the 
proposed determination," 844 P.2d at 290 {citing UCA § 73-4-12), the Court affirmed the 
trial court's dismissal. 
In the present dispute, this Court faces precisely the same issue as it dealt with in 
Jensen. USF, in blatant disregard of the 90-day limitation clearly spelled out in statute, in the 
Waiver form, and in the Proposed Determination itself, completely failed to dispute 
Huntington-Cleveland's senior priority, as presented in the Proposed Determination, until 
August of 1989, more than five years after the statutory deadline had run. (Ex. 48-C; 48-D 
(IPA's first protest to Huntington-Cleveland's water use)) Moreover, in the present dispute, 
unlike the situation in Jensen, there is no question that USF properly received the Proposed 
Determination. In any case, even a colorable claim of improper delivery did not help Jensen: 
this Court held strictly to the rule imposing finality after the 90-day statutory objection 
period. 
Opening Brief 
4837-4612-0704 / Hn£0K 017 i>A**A 1 0 ~f en 
Self-evidently, by its failure to timely protest, USF has lost its right to dispute 
Huntington-Cleveland's seniority, and should have been barred even from raising such long-
abandoned claims. 
CL Estoppel. USF's tardy protest—five years overdue—should be 
estopped, Huntington-Cleveland having relied on the total absence from USF's protest of any 
word against its water usage, and USF's protest having now become instrumental in 
dispossessing Huntington-Cleveland of its longstanding priority. 
b. Laches. Similarly, equity cannot allow such belatedness as 
USF's five-year delay to be rewarded by depriving Huntington-Cleveland of a century and 
more seniority. Laches surely bars such a dilatory challenge. 
c. Waiver. Waiver in this instance need not be implied solely by 
the passage of so much time. The waiver was both express, pursuant to the waiver form it 
signed in 1983 (Ex. 140), and statutory, pursuant to UCA § 73-4-11. By failing to file a 
timely objection, USF waived its right to assert anything contrary to that which was 
contained in the Proposed Determination. USF waited for over five years to make any 
objection to the priority date granted to Huntington-Cleveland in the Proposed 
Determination. (Ex. 48-C) 
Tellingly, USF has never even attempted to present even a shred of evidence that 
would justify its failure to timely file its diligence claim or to object to the priority date 
recognized for Huntington-Cleveland's water right. This is a case that cries out for the 
application of the doctrine of waiver, as well as those of estoppel and laches. 
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USF's challenge to Huntington-Cleveland's claims, ostensibly brought as part of a 
protest to the San Rafael River Drainage Proposed Determination, simply cannot be held to 
be timely, having been filed five whole years too late. USF has plainly waived its right to 
protest Huntington-Cleveland's claims under the Proposed Determination. 
3. Allowing a Separate Action to Circumvent General Adjudication 
Deadlines Violates Public Policy. Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of USF's actions, 
sanctioned by the trial court, is the notion that one may circumvent his own fatal inaction 
(and action) in a general adjudication by bringing a separate lawsuit. While this Court has 
allowed specific disputes to be separately heard during the pendency of a general 
adjudication, see, e.g., Mitchell v. Spanish Fork West Field Irr. Co., 1 Utah 2d 313,265 P.2d 
1016 (1954), such separate actions have not been allowed as vehicles to make an "end run" 
around time bars in a general adjudication as USF has done here. To allow such to occur will 
invite every litigant in a general adjudication who misses a statutory deadline to simply file 
a separate action and thereby circumvent the unwanted result of their own inaction. Quite 
aside from the multiplicity of litigation such a course would invite, such sidestepping and 
evasion of the statutory deadlines would make a mockery of the procedural framework in 
which the Legislature has ordained that the general adjudication process shall operate14. Also, 
it deprives the State Engineer, perhaps the most important party in the general adjudication 
process spelled out in Chapter 4 of Title 73 of the Utah Code, of any opportunity to be heard, 
14
 The court hearing a general adjudication has the power to extend the general 
adjudication deadlines for "due cause shown." UCA § 73-4-10. However, USF hasn't 
bothered to even seek an extension, as it has circumvented the General Adjudication entirely. 
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as he is not a party to the separate, "end run" action. 
II. The Trial Court Erred in Barring Huntington-Cleveland from Submitting 
Evidence That Water from the Mohrland Portal of the Blackhawk Mine Is 
Tributary to Cedar Creek. 
On February 8,1997, the trial court granted USF's motion in limine seeking to estop 
Huntington-Cleveland from adducing at trial any evidence concerning whether water flowing 
from the Mohrland Portal of the Blackhawk Mine is tributary to Cedar Creek. {Findings of 
Fact & Conclusions of Law, R. 2736 f 8.) The trial court ruled that the failure to appeal a 
State Engineer's memorandum decision in 1984 estopped Huntington-Cleveland from 
presenting its evidence as to the tributary of the Mohrland Portal water. (R. 2749 f 9.) 
A. The Elements of Estoppel Were Not Established. 
Despite the court's ruling, the record is bereft of a single admission, statement, or act 
inconsistent with Huntington-Cleveland's continuous assertion of its first right to all of the 
water of Cedar Creek, including the Mohrland Portal contribution. Indeed, even the State 
Engineer's 1984 determination, which the trial court relied upon, clearly recognizes that 
ff
 [t]he Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Company... has a prior right for irrigation purposes 
located several miles downstream.11 {Memorandum Decision Change Application Nos. 91-
251 (a-6961) and 91-316 (a-6963) at page 2. (See Ex. 37-F.)) This explicit recognition of 
Huntington-Cleveland's senior priority, and implicit recognition that this very same 
Mohrland Portal water is tributary to Cedar Creek was precisely what Huntington-Cleveland 
has sought in both the administrative and current judicial proceeding. 
It is, in sum, USF, not Huntington-Cleveland, which should have appealed this 
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determination that Huntington-Cleveland has a prior right. Given the state engineer's open 
recognition of—and USF's acquiescence to—Huntington-Cleveland's prior water right in 
Cedar Creek, together with Huntington-Cleveland's having forborne to challenge USF's use 
in reliance thereon, it is Huntington-Cleveland which can invoke estoppel against USF, rather 
than the other way around. Plaintiffs' 180 degree change in position, suddenly alleging a 
water right in Cedar Creek superior to Huntington-Cleveland's after having acquiesced to the 
latter's manifestly prior entitlement, will, if upheld, severely damage the shareholders of 
Huntington-Cleveland, which has been appropriating and distributing the waters of Cedar 
Creek for beneficial use by its shareholders for more than a lifetime. 
Even if, arguendo, the first element of estoppel—an admission or act inconsistent with 
a later claim—had been established, neither the second nor the third element—action in 
reliance and resulting injury—was ever established before the trial court. USF admitted that 
there was no reliance on the purported failure of Huntington-Cleveland to appeal the State 
Engineer's memorandum decision. USF did not rely on any approval of the State Engineer 
to construct its pipeline to transport water from the Mohrland Portal to Hiawatha. (R. 
1560-1697,1(11,143-166.) 
UCA § 73-3-10 makes it perfectly clear that you cannot effect a change in the place 
of use of a water right until the change application is approved. USF, however, built the 
pipeline, and in violation of the law, changed the place of use from Mohrland to Hiawatha 
12 years prior to its receiving any approval to do so. Not only are USF's actions illegal, but 
they completely undermine any claim under Glenwood Irr. Co. v. Myers, 465 P.2d 1013 
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(Utah 1970), of detrimental reliance on the State Engineer's decision. The improvements 
allegedly constructed in reliance on the approval of its change application were constructed 
more than a decade prior to the issuance of the approval. No injury accrues to USF by 
allowing Huntington-Cleveland to have the Mohrland Portal water adjudicated by the Courts. 
B. The State Engineer was Without Authority to Adjudicate Cedar Creek. 
Under Utah law, the State Engineer lacks authority to adjudicate water rights: 
The office of state engineer was not created to adjudicate vested rights 
between parties, but to administer and supervise the appropriation of the 
waters of the state. . . . in fulfilling his duties, he acts in an administrative 
capacity only and has no authority to determine rights of parties. 
Daniels Irr, Co, v, Daniel Summit Co,, 571 P.2d 1323,1324 (Utah 1977) {quoting Whitmore 
v. Murray City, 107 Utah 445, 154 P.2d 748 (Utah 1944) (citation omitted)). Adjudication 
of water rights is in the demesne of the courts, not administrative officers such as the state 
engineer; this Court, therefore, must determine the rights and obligations of the parties as to 
the Mohrland portal waters, irrespective of the state engineer's administrative decision.15 
C. Huntington-Cleveland's Continuous Use of Cedar Creek since 1929. 
It was established at trial that the flows of Cedar Creek varied from 1 cfs to over 10 
cfs and that the diversion works of Huntington-Cleveland could divert up to 10 cfs when it 
was available. If this were not true, no one would have a right to these flows and this water 
15
 The evidence, had it been allowed, would have indicated that the rock strata in the 
area dip down toward the Mohrland side (R. 2770, Hansen Deposition at 116) and that the 
groundwater therein is thus tributary to Cedar Creek in the San Rafael drainage; indeed, even 
USF's water engineer, Robert Eccli, testified that the Mohrland portal water is tributary to 
Cedar Creek. (R. 2791, Tr. 1512-15.) 
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would not be beneficially used. (R. 2791, Tr. 1689; R. 2789, Tr. 1056, M. Page.) 
Huntington-Cleveland demonstrated at trial continuous use of Cedar Creek since at 
least 1929 by eyewitness accounts. For example, Rex Guyman, an eye witness who literally 
grew up farming the very location where Cedar Creek is diverted into the Cleveland Canal, 
is an extremely persuasive witness as to the diversion of Cedar Creek by Huntington-
Cleveland during the 1929 to 1970 time period. First, he is an totally impartial since he now 
lives in Spring Glen in Carbon County and has no stake or interest in the litigation. He was 
present and observed the flow of Cedar Creek and its diversion into the Cleveland Canal on 
a daily or weekly basis. He testified that it was a constant stream "about five inches deep and 
four to five feet wide." (R. 2788, Tr. p 965.) He also testified that the diversion was 
intentional, that Huntington-Cleveland "redid the cement on the thing two or three times, and 
they always shaped this hole to let the water go into the canal." (R. 2788, Tr. 967.) 
Similarly, Ada Willson, an 83-year-old widow at the time of trial, testified how she 
drove late husband, Myron, when he was Huntington-Cleveland water master in the 1960fs, 
1970!s and 1980?s, to the diversion of Cedar Creek into the Cleveland Canal. Not only was 
water being diverted, but they went there for the express purpose of checking the diversion 
and making sure it was functioning properly, diverting Cedar Creek water into the Cleveland 
Canal. (R. 2789, Tr. 1203.) 
Nearly all of the other testified that water was being diverted into the Cleveland Canal 
from Cedar Creek from at least 1929 through the present day. {See, e.g., R. 2788, Tr. 962 
(Guymon); R. 2789, Tr. 1170 (Stokes); R. 2790, Tr. 1226 (Gardner).) 
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D. Laches Should Not Have Barred Huntington-Cleveland's Evidence as to the 
Mohrland Portal being Tributary to Cedar Creek. 
Laches is an equitable defense to prevent delayed claims that disadvantage another. 
Papanikolas Bros, Ent. v. Sugarhouse Shopping Ctr. A, 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1975). 
Huntington-Cleveland's use of the waters of Cedar Creek has been visible and obvious since 
at least 1929. (R. 2788, Tr. 962 (Guymon); R. 2789, Tr. 1170 (Stokes); R. 2790, Tr. 1226 
(Gardner).) Huntington-Cleveland memorialized its diligence claim 26 years ago, yet despite 
decades of notice that Huntington-Cleveland claims and has been using the waters of Cedar 
Creek, Plaintiffs have delayed.16 
The Supreme Court, in Orderville Irr. Co. v. Glendale Irr. Co., 409 P.2d 616, 619 
(Utah 1965), refused to invoke laches where one party had not "slept on their rights any more 
than ha[d] the [other]," but in the present case, it is ironically the dilatory Plaintiffs who seek 
to invoke laches. Huntington-Clevelandfs continuing use of the waters of Cedar Creek, 
however, insulates it entirely from any laches claim: "[t]he doctrine [of laches] does not 
apply to one in peaceable possession under claim of right," Great Western Reservoir & 
Canal Co. v. Farmers Reservoir & Irr. Co., 124 P.2d 753, 754 (Colo. 1942). 
III. USF Has Forfeited Many of its Water Rights Through Nonuse. 
A. There is No Beneficial Use of Water to Support a Majority of USF's Water 
Rights, and they are forfeited by operation ofUCA § 73-1-4. 
16
 This Court recognized the difficulty of such a burden in Eskelsen v. Town of Perry, 
819 P.2d 770, 774 (1991): f,[I]t would be overly burdensome," said the Court, "and 
unrealistic for us to require a water user to produce unquestionable, overwhelmingly clear 
evidence of water use. Rigid standards regarding proof of amounts would be virtually 
insurmountable barriers to old claims." 
1. Utah Law of Beneficial Use. Water is, perhaps, Utah's most valuable 
natural resource. This Court has memorably likened a drop of water to a drop of gold. 
Longley v. Leucadia Fin. Corp., 2000 UT 69, ^ f 15,9 P.3d 762 {quoting Carbon Canal Co. 
v. Sanpete Water Users Ass >*., 19 Utah 2d 6,9,425 P.2d 405,407 (1967)). In keeping with 
the importance of this well-nigh priceless commodity, one must demonstrate continued 
beneficial use of the water one claims in order to sustain a valid water right. See UCA § 73-
3-1 (1989). Furthermore, Utah Law provides that ff[b]eneficial use shall be the basis, the 
measure and the limit of all rights to the use of water in this state." UCA § 73-1-3 (1989). 
In Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Kimball, 289 P. 116,117 (Utah 1930), this Court set forth 
what it explained as the central principal of the law of prior appropriation: although those 
who first apply water to beneficial use acquire an earlier priority date, "those rights are 
limited to the quantities reasonably necessary for the uses to which it is applied." Id. 
2. Marshaling of the Evidence Presented at Trial on Beneficial Use by 
USF of the Waters of Cedar Creek. USF claimed the beneficial use of water, under Water 
Rights nos. 93-267, 93-904, 93-1089, 93-3525, and 93-3680, for irrigation of 229 acres of 
the Ranch. However, no witness was able to support such a claim. The trial court invoked 
the doctrine of partial forfeiture to reduce USF's Cedar Creek water rights, ruling that USF, 
under these same five water rights, put water from Cedar Creek to beneficial use on Ranch 
and irrigated 135.66 acres with that water17 under the irrigation standard established in Emery 
17
 The doctrine of partial forfeiture was last discussed by this Court in Eskelsen, 819 
P.2d at 775 n.9 (Utah 1991), wherein this Court noted that the absence of partial forfeiture 
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County of 4 acre feet of water per acre of land. This gave USF 542.64 acre feet under these 
five water rights. (R. 2758, ^  3.) 
The trial court, however, did not go nearly far enough in applying partial forfeiture. 
There was considerable testimony presented by both parties at trial as to the number of acres 
irrigated on the Ranch, but this evidence ranged from a low of 20-21 acres in the mid 1970s 
(Tr. 1356) to a high of 105-140 acres at an unspecified time or times between 1961 and 1993 
(Tr. 1810). The following tables marshall that testimony. 
USF's Witnesses 
Time Period 
1930's 
1930's 
1935-1936 
1940's-1950's 
1961, '69, '80, 
'87, '93 
1968-1976 
1968-1976 
Number of Acres 
Does not recall 
No knowledge 
Does not recall 
Does not recall 
105-140-based 
solely on aerial 
photographs 
65 
30 
Witness 
John Nielson 
Ross Black 
John Nielson 
John Nielson 
Don Barnett 
Robert Gitlin 
Robert Gitlin-
Depo. 
Citation 
(R. 2785, Tr. 120.) 
(R. 2787, Tr. 549.) 
(R. 2785, Tr. 78-79.) 
(R. 2785, Tr. 121.) 
(R. 2792, Tr. 1810.) 
(R. 2787, Tr. 603-05.) 
(R. 2787, Tr. 620-25.) 
"would mean that the use of any part of a water right, no matter how small, would preserve 
the whole." The Court observed that, although "the question of partial forfeiture is not 
addressed in our statutes," nonetheless, "[a]s a matter of public policy, it might be prudent 
to allow partial forfeiture; all of the policy reasons that support forfeiture as a general 
principle would be furthered by, and hindered without, partial forfeiture." 
Most recently, the Utah Legislature, in its 2002 general session, passed House Bill no. 
58, Water Forfeiture Amendments. This bill, which amends UCA § 73-1-4 and codifies the 
doctrine of partial forfeiture, was signed into law by Governor Leavitt on March 15, 2002. 
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USF's Witnesses 
Time Period Number of Acres Witness Citation 
Latel960's 50-60 JohnNielson (R. 2785, Tr. 124.) 
Late 1960's 50-60 JohnNielson (R. 2785, Tr. 81,86.) 
Latel960's Guessing 100 JohnNielson (R. 2785, Tr. 109.) 
1971-1993 No knowledge Robert Eccli (R. 2788, Tr. 805.) 
1980's 50-60 Larry Pirce (R. 2787, Tr. 581.) 
1989-Present No knowledge Mike Watson (R. 2787, Tr. 705.) 
1997 106-110 Jimmy Allred (R. 2786, Tr. 399.) 
Table 1. Summary of testimony from USF's Witnesses as to the number 
of acres irrigated on the Ranch. 
Huntington-Cleveland's Witnesses 
Time Period Number of Acres Witness Citation 
1950's 
1950's 
1960's 
1960*s 
1960's 
1960's-Present 
1962-1979 
1970's 
1970's 
1970-1976 
Mid-1970's 
1980's 
1980's-1992 
30-40 
30 
30 
30-40 or less 
40 
30-30+ in 1996 
30 
30 
30 
35 
20-21 
35-37 
30 
LaMond Gardner I 
Dennis Ward 1 
Dennis Ward 1 
LaMond Gardner I 
Ray Stokes 
Duane Kay Jensen 
Dennis Ward 1 
LaMond Gardner 
Dennis Ward 
Ray Stokes 
Lee Lemmon 
Dennis Ward 
LaMond Gardner 
(R. 2790, Tr. 1249.) 
(R. 2790, Tr. 1323.) 
(R. 2790, Tr. 1323.) 
(R. 2790, Tr. 1254.) 
(R. 2789, Tr. 1183.) 
(R. 2789, Tr. 1100-07.) 
(R. 2790, Tr. 1339.) 
(R. 2790, Tr. 1256.) 
(R. 2790, Tr. 1323.) 
(R. 2789, Tr. 1185.) 
(R. 2790, Tr. 1356.) 
(R. 2790, Tr. 1324.) 
(R. 2790, Tr. 1257.) 
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Table 2. Summary of testimony from Huntington-Cleveland's Witnesses 
as to the number of acres irrigated on the Ranch. 
No witness called by any party testified that there was anywhere near sufficient 
irrigated acreage, 135.66 acres, to support the 542.64 acre feet of beneficial use found by the 
trial court, with the sole exception of USF's rebuttal expert, Don Barnett, who based his 
testimony on interpretations of aerial photographs. Mr. Barnett, however, should not have 
been allowed to testify; however, even if Mr. Barnett's testimony had been properly allowed, 
it is insufficient to withstand the great weight of the evidence that at most 30 to 60 acres were 
irrigated on the Ranch. And this amount of beneficial use would support only 120 to 240 acre 
feet of water at most. 
B. USF's "Rebuttal Expert," Don Barnett, Should not have been Permitted to 
Testify since He was not Properly Identified as an Expert and His Testimony 
was Improper for Rebuttal. 
USF proposed Mr. Barnett as an expert witness on December 16, 1996, a full month 
after the November 15, 1996, disclosure deadline set by the trial court in its First Revised 
Scheduling Order (R. 961). When Huntington-Cleveland objected to this untimely 
identification, the court properly excluded him from testifying, but left open the possibility 
of his testifying as a rebuttal expert witness. (R. 2792, Tr. 1789.) Thus, after the close of 
Huntington-Cleveland's defense, USF called Mr. Barnett as a rebuttal expert. Huntington-
Cleveland objected, on the grounds that there was nothing to be rebutted: no expert of 
Huntington-Cleveland's had testified as to the acreage irrigated, and witnesses from both 
sides had nearly unanimously testified that the irrigated acreage of the Ranch amounted to 
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approximately 30 to 60 acres or less (R. 2792, Tr. 1787-94). 
Despite Huntington-Cleveland's objection, however (R. 2792, Tr. 1787-1794), the 
trial court abused its discretion and allowed Mr. Barnett to testify as a rebuttal expert witness 
as to irrigated acreage. 
1. Mr. Barnett *s Testimony Should Have Been Excluded Because He 
Was Not Timely Identified. In Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307 (Utah 1993), an obstetric 
malpractice case, the trial court had ordered that both parties designate all witnesses by 
October 31, 1989. Trial was slated for March 5, 1991. In January of 1991, in response to a 
summary judgment motion filed by Curtis, Arnold filed an affidavit from one Dr. McHenry, 
an obstetric specialist. Prior to filing the affidavit, Dr. McHenry had not been designated as 
a witness, nor identified in any way. Arnold argued that since Dr. McHenry was a rebuttal 
witness, his designation was not subject to the scheduling order. The trial court, however, 
disagreed and granted summary judgment for Curtis. On appeal, this Court affirmed, in part 
because it appeared that the McHenry affidavit was really part of Arnold's case-in-chief, but 
also because Dr. McHenry was introduced in violation of the scheduling order: 
We find no merit [said the Court] in Arnold's argument that Dr. 
McHenry's affidavit was in the nature of rebuttal testimony and that it was not 
subject to the requirements of the scheduling order.... there is no indication 
in the scheduling order that the court intended to make any differentiation in 
the designation of witnesses who might appear in the case-in-chief as opposed 
to rebuttal.... 
In summary, we held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing to consider Dr. McHenry's affidavit on the ground that it was filed in 
derogation of the scheduling order entered eight months earlier and in view of 
the fact that Arnold did not at any time ask to be relieved of the time 
requirement of the order. 
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846 P.2d at 1310 (emphasis added); see also Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021, 1024 n.2 
(Utah 1994) (distinguishing Board of Education v. Barton, 617 P.2d 347 (Utah 1980), in that 
the Barton plaintiffs calling an undisclosed rebuttal witness was proper only because the 
pretrial order therein, by its terms, had expressly indicated that disclosure of rebuttal 
witnesses was not required.). Notice that the Arnold Court based its affirmance, not on the 
lapse of the discovery cut-off, nor on the nearness of the trial, one month off, but on the fact 
that Arnold's late disclosure was a violation of the scheduling order. 
In the present dispute, USF, like Arnold, has introduced a witness in derogation of the 
Court's scheduling Order. Granted, USFfs month-long delay is not so serious as Arnold's 
year-long delay, but neither is it a minor, day-or-two infraction to be overlooked. As the 
Arnold Court explained: "While scheduling orders should never be so inflexible as to not 
accommodate exigencies that may occur, they are necessary to expedite the flow of cases 
through the court system and should not be lightly disregarded." 846 P.2d at 1310. 
2. Mr. Burnett's Testimony was Improper Rebuttal "Rebuttal evidence 
is evidence tending to refute, modify, explain, or otherwise minimize or nullify the effect of 
the opponent's evidence." Handle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329,1338 (Utah 1993) {citingBarton, 
617 P.2d at 349). In Turner, 872 P.2d 1021, this Court, after a review of the "significant 
policies" served by "disclosure] of all potential witnesses in advance of trial," 872 P.2d at 
1023-24, explained the test for determining whether an undisclosed witness should be 
permitted to testify as a rebuttal witness: "When the offering party contends that the 
undisclosed witness is necessary to rebut the adverse party's evidence, the issue hinges on 
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whether the evidence 'sought to be rebutted could reasonably have been anticipated prior to 
trial/" 872 P.2d at 1024 (quoting 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 371, at 570 (1991)) (other citations 
omitted); in other words, "rebuttal testimony offered by the plaintiff should rebut the 
testimony brought out by the defendant and consist of nothing which could have been offered 
in chief," 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 373, at 572 (1991). 
Turner involved a traffic accident at an intersection. Plaintiff Turner had presented 
evidence at trial that Nelson had been negligent and run a stop sign, causing the crash. 
Nelson responded that Salt Lake City was at fault for negligent design of the intersection in 
question, and for allowing the stop sign to become obstructed. Claiming surprise, Turner 
sought to introduce the rebuttal testimony of one Jim Nakling, a resident at the intersection, 
as to the condition of the stop sign. Since Nakling had not been identified by Turner's pretrial 
witness designation, however, the trial court refused to allow his testimony. 
On appeal, Turner argued that the trial court had abused its discretion by refusing her 
rebuttal. This Court, however, affirmed, noting that Nelson's essential defense had always 
been that the stop sign had been obstructed. Therefore, since Turner "'could reasonably have 
anticipated' the testimony of Nelson and Nelson's witnesses that the sign was obstructed," 
872 P.2d at 1024, this Court concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion by 
refusing to allow Mr. Nakling's testimony.18 
18
 Similarly, in Roundy v. Staley, 1999 UT App 229,984 P.2d 404, cert denied, 994 
P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999), another case involving a traffic accident, plaintiff Roundy made what 
amounted to an oral motion to compel Staley to disclose as a witness a Mr. Gunderson, who 
had made a surveillance tape of certain of Roundy's activities. Staley argued that he had not 
been required to identify Gunderson as a witness, or reveal the existence of the tape he had 
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Although this Court has held that "[generally, 'testimony presented for the purpose 
of rebuttal should be admitted, even if the rebuttal is somewhat repetitive of testimony on 
issues addressed during the case-in-chief," Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, f 23,29 P.3d 683 
(citing Workman v. Henrie, 71 Utah 400, 407, 266 P. 1033, 1036 (1928)), this generalized 
allowance does not negate the requirement that rebuttal testimony be offered to rebut, not to 
add testimony to a case-in-chief. As this Court noted in Turner, the touchstone remains 
"whether the evidence 'sought to be rebutted could reasonably have been anticipated prior 
to trial." 872 P.2d at 1024 (quoting 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 371, at 570 (1991)). 
In the present case, the irrigated acreage at the Ranch was (and still is) a major issue 
discussed at length during discovery. USF prepared 12 other witnesses, besides Barnett, to 
testify regarding the issue, and Huntington-Cleveland put on five (none of whom testified as 
an expert). Huntington-Cleveland's witnesses, and their testimony on this point, were well-
known to USF long before trial. USF, in short, could not merely "reasonably anticipate" 
Huntington-Cleveland's evidence, USF actually did so and prepared a dozen witnesses to 
testify on the matter in its case-in-chief. 
Like Mr. Nakling in Turner, Don Barnett's testimony was improper and should have 
made, because his testimony and the tape were rebuttal evidence. 1999 UT App at f 12. The 
trial court had agreed, and allowed the tape and Gunderson's testimony. The Court of 
Appeals disagreed, noting that "rebuttal evidence is that which a party may or may not use, 
depending on the testimony elicited at trial." Id. Staley, however, had been well aware of the 
substance of Roundy's testimony before trial, and had obviously had Gunderson prepare the 
surveillance tape for use at trial; therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded, "we cannot 
characterize the tape and testimony as rebuttal evidence." Id. at f 13. The matter was reversed 
and remanded for a new trial. 
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been excluded. USF should have identified Mr. Barnett at the outset and presented him in 
chief since (a) his testimony as to the irrigated acreage at the Ranch went to a major issue 
well-known to all the parties, and (b) USF obviously intended to present his testimony from 
the beginning. Mr. Barnett's testimony simply cannot be characterized as rebuttal evidence. 
C The Trial Court's Ruling of 135.66 Irrigated Acres on the Ranch is Clearly 
Erroneous. 
However, even if Mr. Barnett's testimony had been somehow proper, his examination 
of photographs from 1961, 1969, 1980, 1987, and 1993 does not provide any evidence of 
beneficial use during any other year: the 1940s, the 1950s, 1962-68, the 1970s, 1981-1986, 
or 1988-1992. Water use varied widely on the Ranch. Each of these time periods is in excess 
of the statutory five-year forfeiture period, see UC A § 73-1-4(1 )(a), and water rights nos. 93-
267,93-904,93-1089,93-3525, and 93-3680 must accordingly be reduced to a maximum of 
120-240 acre feet. 
D. USF has Forfeited the Winter Stockwatering Portion of Water Right no. 93-
267. 
Water right no. 93-267 is comprised of two components. During the summer irrigation 
season it may be diverted from Cedar Creek onto the Ranch for irrigation and stock water. 
Additionally, during the winter non-irrigation season it is approved for diversion from Cedar 
Creek on to the Ranch for stockwatering. It is the only one of USF's 17 stockwater rights that 
may be diverted from Cedar Creek onto the Ranch. However, the uncontroverted testimony 
of USF's own witness was that during the winters from 1980 through 1989, no cattle were 
kept on the Ranch. (R. 2787, Tr. 592:3-11.) The evidence of USF's lessee thus plainly 
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admits that for ten consecutive years, USF made no winter use of the winter stockwatering 
portion of water right 93-267; therefore, USF must be held to have entirely forfeited the right 
to divert water onto the Ranch during the winter, non-irrigation season. 
E. USF Has Wasted an Extensive Amount of Water and its Water Rights 
Should be Reduced Accordingly. 
At trial, USF excused its rather minimal beneficial use of Cedar Creek water on the 
Ranch by asserting that it and its predecessors have used "all of the available water from 
Cedar Creek for irrigating approximately 30 to 50 acres on Ranch and have had ditches and 
furrows in place ready to irrigate other lands on Ranch but have not had sufficient water to 
irrigate these lands19. The lack of available water prevents forfeiture." (R. 1960.) It claims, 
however, that lack of available water prevents forfeiture. Huntington-Cleveland submits that 
where lack of water may prevent forfeiture, waste of water does not.20 
This Court, in Wayman v. Murray City Corp., 458 P.2d 861 (Utah 1969) stated that 
all water users are required to utilize reasonable and efficient means in taking their water vis-
a-vis other users "to the end that wastage of water is avoided and that the greatest amount of 
available water is put to beneficial use." See also, Brian v. FremontIrr. Co., 186 P.2d 588 
19If all of the available water in Cedar Creek is in actuality only sufficient to irrigate 
30 to 50 acres of land, USF's Cedar Creek water rights should be pared down to 120 - 200 
acre-feet (acres x duty of 4 acre-feet per acre irrigated) of water, not the 542.64 acre-feet of 
water that the trial court awarded for 135.66 acres of land. 
20
 Even if we utilize USF's flow of Cedar Creek as .9 cfs, the beneficial use of Cedar 
Creek water by USF does not match the volume of water available. An average of .9 cfs 
during the irrigation season would total 651 acre-feet which is sufficient water to irrigate 163 
acres of land, far in excess of the 30 to 50 acres actually irrigated. 
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(Utah 1947) (Because of the aridity of Utah and the important public policy of conserving 
water, wasting water injures the public welfare and it is therefore the duty of the water user 
"to return surplus or waste water into the stream from which it was taken so that further use 
can be made by others."). 
Various authorities have made the observation that in every use of water for irrigation 
there is some unavoidable loss either through evaporation or seepage. Where this natural loss 
might be necessary in one case, it may be considered an extreme case of waste in another. 
See Clesson S. Kinney, Kinney on Irrigation and Water Rights §912, at 1614 (2nd ed. 1912). 
What constitutes the actual wasting of water depends upon the specific facts surrounding 
each individual case and in determining waste a court should consider such things as the 
proper duty of water for the land, the means of diverting the water, whether the canals and 
ditches are in reasonably good enough condition to prevent unnecessary loss of water, the 
condition of the land to receive the water, and the methods of applying the water to the land. 
See id. Kinney further provides: 
If an amount of water is being conducted to a certain tract of land in 
excess of the fixed duty for the same, or if there is not a fixed duty of water in 
excess of the amount of water which the land when put in the proper condition 
to receive water will absorb for the actual production of the crops thereon, then 
there is a waste of the amount in excess of the quantity which is actually 
needed for that purpose. An excessive amount of water used upon the land is 
at times more injurious to the land itself than a scarcity, and where it is thus 
used others may successfully lay claim to the excessive amount. 
Id. at 1615. Also noteworthy is the fact that excessive seepage from ditches and canals, 
which might otherwise be prevented with reasonable effort and expense, is considered waste. 
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"Water is too valuable to be wasted... by waste resulting from the means employed to carry 
it to the place of use, which can be avoided by the exercise of a reasonable degree of care to 
prevent unnecessary loss." Id. at 1617. 
At trial several witnesses attested to the extraordinary amount of waste of Cedar Creek 
water attributable to USF. Jimmy Alfred, a witness called by USF, testified that from the 
diversion on Cedar Creek down to the Ranch, one third of the water that is diverted is lost. 
(R. 2787, Tr. 470.) In addition, Larry Pirce, another USF witness, testified that he did not 
grow any crops on Ranch during the summertime because he ran out of water due to the fifty 
percent loss in the one and one half to two mile long ditch that ran from Cedar Creek to the 
Ranch21. (R. 2787, Tr. 594-95.) Robert Eccli, yet another USF witness, similarly testified 
that forty-five percent of the water diverted from Cedar Creek into the Ranch ditch was lost 
due to evaporation and seepage. He testified that the water could be saved by lining the ditch 
with cement but that although there was concern at USF about the loss, no efforts were ever 
made to line the ditch in order to get more water. (R. 2790, Tr. 1395-97.) 
USF employee Robert Gitlin testified that during the winter, although he would not 
irrigate on the ranch, he would divert water onto the ranch because USF instructed him to do 
so. USF did not care how the water was used, it just wanted the water to be turned onto the 
21A ditch two miles long is relatively short. Compare the length of the Cleveland 
Canal which is roughly fifteen miles long. A fifty percent loss in water over a short two 
miles is extraordinary. 
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ranch22. He also testified that it was very possible that for weeks on end water ran through 
the same location on the ranch and then back to the creek. (R. 2787, Tr. 627-28.) Duane Kay 
Jensen testified that he also observed that from the 1970s to the present, water was allowed 
to run in the same area day after day. This practice created more return flow for downstream 
water users. (R. 2789, Tr. 1116-18.) LaMond Gardner testified that from the 1950's to the 
time of the filing of the present suit water was diverted and allowed to run day after day, 
simply flowing across a saturated portion of the ranch and eventually making its way back 
to Cedar Creek. (R. 2790, Tr. 1250-57.) 
The above, largely uncontroverted evidence proves two things. First, there was 
enough water at USF's diversion point to irrigate much more land than was being irrigated, 
but because of the remarkable waste of water (50% in a ditch that was only two miles long 
at the most), only a small fraction of the actually diverted water was placed to beneficial use. 
Second, USF totally lost sight of the concept of beneficial use and replaced it with waste. The 
fact that water was left to run on the ranch for days on end, making its way back to the 
stream as return flow is further proof that USF did not divert and beneficially use its water 
22
 This Court has said that with regard to winter water use a water user cannot "legally 
establish a prior right to the use of water for irrigation by merely flooding [his] lands and by 
permitting it to gather into pools on the surface or raising the water level underneath the 
surface in the hope of obtaining sufficient moisture to raise crops in the ensuing summer." 
Hardy v. Beaver County Irr. Co., 234 P. 524, 530 (Utah 1924). Such a wasteful use of water 
will not be tolerated in this arid region, especially when it can be used in the "ordinary way" 
for irrigation and other domestic purposes. See id. The Court went on to say that it did not 
mean to imply that winter use of water is prohibited as being wasteful. However, an 
appropriator must "use some method of irrigation by means of which the water will be 
confined to the lands to be irrigated and not permitted to flow over the lands." Id. 
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rights on Cedar Creek. The trial court should have recognized the concept of beneficial use, 
the value of water and declared the wasted portion of water for the Ranch to be forfeited 
under UCA § 73-1-4. Accordingly, water right no.'s 93-904,93-3525,93-1089,93-267 and 
93-3680 should be reduced by the waste factor of 50%. 
F. Water Right No. 93-3524 (the Borehole Right) was Forfeited. 
USF submitted into evidence two internal water reports (Ex's. 158 and 159), which 
established that Water Right no. 93-3524 (a-268), the so-called Borehole right, had not been 
beneficially used between 1964 and 1972. This lapse was also admitted at trial by Robert 
Eccli, USF's water engineer. (Ex. 158 at 44, Ex. 159 at 2; R. 2790, Tr. 1404-05).23 
No evidence was presented at trial to rebut the admission that Water Right no. 93-
3524 had not been used at any time during the eight years between 1964 and 1972, and had 
thus been forfeited due to nonuse pursuant to UCA § 73-1-4. The trial court, however, 
refused to hold the right forfeit because it found the water could have been used—albeit 
illegally—at the Ranch during this eight-year period. (R. 2745, f36.) This finding assumes 
that USF could have been using this water beneficially at the Ranch during this period. 
However, as discussed above, there was not sufficient beneficial use on the Ranch to 
preserve even those rights actually assigned to it24. Therefore, USF cannot preserve this right 
23
 Prior to 1964, this water had been diverted from Cedar Creek into the mines via a 
vertical borehole, and pumped out of the Blackhawk Portal for use in Hiawatha. In 1972, a 
pipeline was constructed from the Mohrland Portal to Hiawatha, through which water under 
this water right began again to flow to Hiawatha. 
24
 Note that the doctrine of estoppel has no place here. Forfeiture is not among the 
State Engineer's considerations in approving change applications. Forfeiture must be asserted 
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by claiming it was illegally used on the Ranch. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons set forth herein, this Court should hold (1) that USF was barred by 
estoppel, laches, and waiver from asserting a priority senior to that of Huntington-Cleveland; 
(2) that Huntington-Cleveland's water rights have a priority of 1877 or 1885, while those of 
USF have a priority of 1889 at the earliest; (3) that the water flowing from the Mohrland 
portal of the Blackhawk Mine is tributary to Cedar Creek; (4) that the trial court's 
determination that the beneficial use of 542.64 acre-feet of water for the irrigation of 135.66 
acres at the Ranch was unsupported by substantial evidence; that USF's rebuttal expert, Don 
Barnett, should not have been permitted to testify in that capacity; (5) that, as a result, the 
acre-footage allowable at the Ranch should be reduced to 120-240 acre-feet for the irrigation 
of between 30 and 60 acres; (6) that USF's winter stockwatering rights under Water Rights 
nos. 93-267 has been forfeited by nonuse under the doctrine of partial forfeiture; and (7) that 
USF has also forfeited Water Right no. 93-3524 (the Borehole right). 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ Xday of April, 2002, 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
JDatfid B^  Hartvigsi 
Scott M>£llswortt 
in Court. UCA § 73-1-4. Huntington-Cleveland cannot be estopped for not raising a 
forfeiture claim in the wrong forum. See Whitmore v. Murray City, 154 P.2d 748,750 (Utah 
1944) (fThe office of state engineer was not created to adjudicate vested rights between 
parties, but to administer and supervise the appropriation of the waters of the state."). 
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